Fleet dynamics and capital malleability by Da Rocha Alvarez, Jose Maria et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fleet dynamics and capital malleability
Jose Maria Da Rocha Alvarez and Raul Prellezo and Jaume
Sempere and Luis Taboada-Antelo
ITAM
1 December 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75370/
MPRA Paper No. 75370, posted 3 December 2016 13:19 UTC
Fleet dynamics and capital malleability∗
Jose´-Mar´ıa Da-Rocha
ITAM and U.Vigo†
Raul Prellezo
AZTI‡
Jaume Sempere
El Colegio de Me´xico§
Lu´ıs Taboada Antelo
(IIM) CSIC ¶
December 2016
Abstract
When individual stay/exit decisions depend on the opportunity cost of exiting, capital mal-
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less exit, a less productive fleet, and overcapitalization, as input controls require a higher
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1 Introduccion
We extend Da-Rocha and Sempere (2016) to study the transitional dynamics of firms
when individual stay/exit decisions depend on expected future opportunity benefits that
are afected by public policy. As a particular case, we use the model to study the dynamics
of firms when a a policy of stock rehabilitation is implemented in a marine fishery.
One of the most important challenges for the management of marine fisheries, as is the
case in other industries, is over-capitalization. In their seminal paper, Clark et al. (1979)
showed that different assumptions about capital malleability1 have a significant influence on
the form of physical capital dynamics. In particular, overcapitalization is associated to non
malleability of capital.
Even when disinvestment in physical capital is not feasible for an individual vessel, the
depreciation rate is equal to zero and capital has a negligible scrap value, malleability of
physical capital at the fishery level is closely related to the decisions of entry and exit taken by
firms. In this paper, we show that when, as in Ikiara and Odink (1999), individual stay/exit
decisions depend on the opportunity cost of exiting, capital malleability is endogenously
determined by the instruments used for stock rehabilitation. In particular, we characterize
the transitional dynamics caused by stock rehabilitation policies in a fishery and show that,
along the stock rehabilitation path, capital malleability depends on the type of management
control, as some of the policies induce capital reductions (through enough exit of firms) and
some others not.
As Weninger and Just (2002), we assume that individual firm’s abilities follow a stochastic
process and that there is a fixed operating cost that firms must incur if they want to remain
in the fishery. Those two assumptions generate firm dynamics over time. Therefore, in
our environment, individual rational decisions will not be based only on current profits
1The term “malleability” is commonly used to refer to the existence or not of constraints on the disin-
vestment of capital assets. If these constraints do not exist, then capital is fully malleable.
2
and the whole transitional dynamic –induced by the instrument used to achieve the stock
rehabilitation objective– must be computed to capture firm behavior and its consequences on
the economic variables. We also assume that the fishery is operated by heterogeneous agents
as in (Clark, 1980; Terrebonne, 1995; Heaps, 2003) to relate (expected) future opportunity
benefits for firms with the policy instruments.
Following Homans and Wilen (1997), we assume that the instruments chosen by managers
to achieve the biological targets are exogenously determined.2. We compute fleet dynamics
based on individual stay/exit decisions when managers use a non distortionary instrument
(i.e. taxes, ITQs), and also when managers use input controls – the basic instruments in
the command and control management approach used currently in many fisheries. We show
that a management policy based on input controls generates less exit, a less productive fleet,
and more overcapitalization. In particular, we show that this policy leads to smaller vessels
with lower yield and individual profits, and lower wages. The less productive vessels stay in
the fishery and pay the iddling cost waiting for better times and this reduces average factor
productivity of the fleet. The result of input controls is that a higher number of vessels is
required to achieve the same biological targets, and this implies an over-capitalized fleet.
Our results would be supported by the empirical evidence provided by the spanish fleet. As
the management system in the Mediterranean is mainly based on effort restrictions (limita-
tions on average days at sea and other measure of time per vessel), our results would imply
that we shoud expect more overcapitalization in fleets operating in the Mediterranean than
in fleets operating in the Atlantic. Figure 1 shows the status of the Spanish fleets. The
long-term economic profitability of vessels as measured by the Return on Fixed Tangible
Assets (ROFTA) is plotted on the y-axis, and the Sustainable Harvest Indicator (SHI) on
the x-axis. Values of SHI greater than 1.2 represent that fleets are operating under biological
imbalance. The figure shows indeed that Mediterranean fleets operate under lower ROFTA
2For an analysis of the optimal combination of instruments under stock uncertainty see Da-Rocha and
Gutie´rrez (2012).
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and greater biological imbalance than Alantic fleets. This suggests (more) overcapitalization
in the Mediterranean (than in Atlantic) fleets.
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Figure 1: ROFTA (Rofta (%)= Net profit/Capital Value, This measures the sector’s long-term economic
profitability) and Sustainable Harvest Indicator (Measures how much a fleet segment depends on overex-
ploited stocks at levels above MSY for its revenues; Greater than than 1.2 = biological imbalance ) for
different Spanish fleet segments. Red Med Black Atlantic. Source: MAAMMA (2014)
The analysis of firms’ dynamics based on individual stay/exit decisions has received much
less attention in the economics literature than the analysis of optimal capacity investment
paths under the assumption of a sole fleet owner. Indeed, in the spirit of (Smith, 1968,
1969) the literature has mostly focused on models in which capital is assumed to be equal
to the number of vessels in fleets composed by homogeneous vessels. Stay/exit decisions are
modeled as an investment/disinvestment decision, and (usually) a sole fleet owner choses
the optimal fleet size, or the capacity utilization under different assumptions on investment
cost (Boyce, 1995; Nøstbakken, 2008; Sandal et al., 2007), stock dynamics (Botsford and
Wainwright, 1985), stock uncertainty (Hannesson, 1987; Singh et al., 2006; Da-Rocha et
al., 2014b) or the strategic effect of irreversible investment decisions under an strategic
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environment (Sumaila, 1995).3
We depart significantly from this literature. Our paper follows closely Weninger and Just
(2002) and Da-Rocha and Sempere (2016) where individual (exit/stay) decisions depend on
the (expected) future opportunity cost of exiting. In fact, in our model, in each moment of
time individual firms assess the expected value of remaining in the industry, and compare
it to the present discounted value of profits associated with exiting the industry. Based
on this comparison, individual firms decide to stay in or exit the industry. The aggregate
behavior of individual firms, and not the decision of a monopolistic fleet owner, determines
the dynamics of capital in the industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and characterizes
the equilibrium of the model. Section 3 discusses de case study. Section 4 presents our
results distinguishing those refering to the steady state from those regarding the transitional
dynamics of the model. Finally Section 5 presents some conclusions.
2 The Model
We consider a natural resource industry with heterogeneous firms. This industry is output
constrained by a regulatory agency in order to achieve the rehabilitation of a given stock.
There are two markets in the economy: a final goods and a labor (which is used to produce
the final good) market. Taking output price as the numeraire, we denote wages by w(t).
We asume that a continuum of identical households, which own the firms, consume the final
good and supply labour by solving a consumption-leisure maximization problem.
We assume that firms, which have a finite lifespan, are heterogeneous. Let g(z, t) be the
measure of firms over time (i.e. the number of firms with productivity z at time t). Incumbent
3For an excellent summary of the literature see Nøstbakken et al. (2011).
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firms’ decision rules at period t depend on z. We denote as y(z, t) and l(z, t) the optimal
choice of output and labor.
As Weninger and Just (2002), we assume that individual firms’ abilities follow a stochastic
process and that there is a fixed operating cost of cf . That is, if a firm wants to remain active
in the industry then it must pay the fixed cost. These two assumptions make that individual
firms change over time. In each particular moment, some of them expand production, hiring
staff; others contract production, firing staff; and others exit the industry.
The incumbent firms’ decision problem produces two types of decision rule. There are
continuous decision rules for the optimal choice of output y(z, t) and labor l(z, t), and there
is a discrete decision rule for the optimal stay/exit decision.
Therefore, on one hand, we have endogenous exit. This decision depends on each period’s
employment l(z, t) and output y(z, t). Conditional on each period’s choices, l(z, t) and y(z, t),
the firm must assess the expected value of remaining in the industry, and must compare it
to the present discounted value of profits associated with exiting the industry S(t) –a scrap
value. On the other hand, a finite vessel lifespan implies depreciation. Finally, managers
of the fisheries allow entry when quota exceeds fleet capacity. Note that in contrast to the
standard framework, the distribution of firms’ productivity is not exogenous. In our model
it is endogenously determined by the firms decisions on exit. Therefore, g(z, t) evolves over
time.
We analyze the model in three steps. First we solve the individual problems of firms and
households. This establishes the relationship between input controls and exit decisions.
Later, we specify the dynamics of the distribution of firms and the feasibility conditions.
Finally, we define the equilibrium.
The problem of incumbent firms Let τl be a constraint on effort (in particular, τl will
be the maximum number of hours of labor per vessel). Conditional on this constraint, firms
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maximize profits subject to their available technology, y =
√
z l.4 Thus, at time t, the
intra-temporal profit maximization problem is
max
l(t),y(t)
y(t)− w(t)l(t)− cf ,
s.t. y(t) =
√
z l(t),
l(t) ≤ τl,
where profits are defined as revenues y(t) less labor costs w(t)l(t) less the fixed operation
cost cf . Note that we assume that fishermen behavior is non affected by stock variability,
–which is consistent with the findings of Ward and Sutinen (1994)– and that physical capital
at vessel level is non-malleable (and therefore we can normalize capital per vessel to one).
Solving for the first order conditions of this problem, we have that labor demand, given by
l(t, z) =

z
4w(t)2
if z ≤ zc(t),
τl if z > z
c(t),
and profits, given by
pi(t, z) =

pi(t)z − cf if z ≤ zc(t),
√
zτl − wτl − cf if z > zc(t).
depend on the input constraint.
We assume that the productivity shock z follows a stochastic process with a negative expected
growth rate, µ, i.e.
dz = −µdt+ σzdW,
4Our technology is in accordance with the fifty-fifty rule, i.e. 50% of net revenues are accounted for by
payments to crew members.
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where σz is the per-unit time volatility, and dW is the random increment to a Weiner process.
The dynamic incumbents’ problem is an stopping time problem defined by:
v(z, t) = max
τ
E0
∫ τ
0
pi(z, t)e(ρ+λ)tdt+ S(t)eρt,
s.t. dz = −µzdt+ σzdwz.
where λ is the exogenous death rate of firms.5 Let, z be such that the establishment does
not exit. Then the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation holds
(ρ+ λ)v(z, t) = pi(t)z − cf + µz∂zv(z, t) + σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z, t) + ∂tv(z, t).
The value matching and the smooth pasting conditions at the switching point z are v(z, t) =
S(t) and v′(z, t) = 0, respectively. For z lower than the exit threshold, z ≤ z, we have
v(z, t) = S(t). The incumbent’s problem can also be witten as a HJB variational inequality,
i.e.
min
Iexit(z,t)
{
(ρ+ λ)v(z, t)− pi(t)z + cf − µz∂zv(z, t)− σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z, t)− ∂tv(z, t), v(z, t)− S(t)
}
(1)
where Iexit(z, t) is an indicator function that summarises the endogeneous decision of exit.
Household’s problem Each representative household solves a static consumption-leisure
maximization problem:
max
C,L
logC − eL,
subject to the budget constraint C = w(t)L+ Π(t), where the right-hand side of the budget
constraint is given by the wage income wL and the total profits of operating firms, Π.6
5The death rate of firms is equal to the inverse of the vessel lifetime.
6Controls on inputs/outputs per vessel generate unemployment and (potentially) introduce heterogeneity
in househodls. We apply a convenient technical devise developed by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)
to simplify the problem and use the representative household framework to solve the problem. That is, we
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Notice that wages are determined by
w(t) = e[w(t)L(t) + Π(t)].
Firm dynamics For prices to be calculated, the dynamics of firms must be computed. In
our economy, the evolution of the measure of firms is determined endogenously by entry/exit
decisions made by firms themselves. Formally, g(z, t) follows a Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck
(KFP) equation
∂tg(z, t) = −∂z[µzg(z, t)] + σ
2
z
2
∂zzg(z, t)− (Iexit(z, t) + λ)g(z, t) + ge(z, t). (2)
where, entry, when it is allowed, is given by the distribution ge(z, t).
Notice that the mass of firms, N(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
g(z)dz represents the number of firms. Therefore,
N(t) is equal to capital in period t in Clark et al. (1979). Therefore, investment in “capital”,
satisfies N(t+ dt) = N(t) + I(t). Then, investment is equal to
I(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
[ge(z, t)− (Iexit(z, t) + λ)g(z, t)] dz.
The term “non-malleability” is commonly used to refer to the existence of constraints on the
disinvestment of capital assets utilized in exploiting the resource stock. Therefore, capital is
non-malleable if 0 ≤ I(t) ≤ ∞.
Feasibility conditions To close the model we need to define feasibility conditions. The
assume the existence of a lottery such that each household has the same probability pn of being selected to
work. Therefore, in expected terms, each household will work pnL hours. Note that the rules of this lottery
imply that there is perfect insurance in the sense that every household gets paid whether she works or not.
Hence, they will have identical consumption, i.e. C = wL+ Π. Under these conditions, the utility function
associated with the lottery is quasilinear in labour.
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(Iexit(z, t) + λ) g(z, t) exit and death
Incumbents at time t ↗
g(z, t) ↘
1− (Iexit(z, t) + λ) g(z, t) survivors
↓
Incumbents at time t+dt
↑
entrants ge(z, t) = gss(z)
Figure 2: Firm dynamics
household budget constraint implies that the final output market is in equilibrium. That is,
C = wL+ Π⇒ C =
∫ ∞
z(t)
y(z, t)g(z, t)dz − cfN(t),
where cfN(t) is the value of ouput allocated to produce the fixed operating cost.
7 The
manager of the fishery sets the input control such that the individual decisions given by
y(t, z) =

y(t, z)∗ = z
2w(t)
− if z ≤ zc(t)
y(t, z)c =
√
zτl if z > z
c(t)
satisfy the quota path, Q(t). Therefore, feasibility conditions in the labour and output
7Note that C is equal to
wL+ Π =
∫ ∞
z(t)
w(t)l(t)g(z, t)dz +
∫ ∞
z(t)
(y(t)− w(t)l(t)− cf ) g(z, t)dz =
∫ ∞
z(t)
y(z, t)g(z, t)dz − cfN(t).
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markets are given respectively by
∫ ∞
z(t)
l(z, t)g(z, t)dz = L(t), (3)∫ zc(t)
z(t)
y∗(t)g(z, t)dz +
∫ ∞
zc(t)
y(t, z)cg(z, t)dz = Q(t). (4)
Note that, given Q(t), equations (3 -4) jointly determine w(t) and z(t). Moreover, after some
manipulation, we can write the wage as a function of e, Q and the mass of firms, N(t), i.e
w(t) = e [Q(t)− cfN(t)] .
2.1 Definition of equilibrium
Given an output restriction, Q(t), and an input control τl, an equilibrium is a measure of
firms g(z, t), wages w(t), incumbents’ value functions v(z, t), individual decision rules l(z, t),
y(z, t) and a threshold z(t), such that:
i) (Firm optimization) Given prices w(t), the exit rule, Iexit(z, t) and v(z, t) solve incum-
bent problem, equation (1), and l(z, t), y(z, t), are optimal policy functions.
ii) (Firm measure) g(z, t), satisfies the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation (2).
ii) (Market clearing-feasibility) Given individual decision rules, and the firms’ measure
function, w(t) and z(t), solve equations (3 -4).
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Steady State The economy can be represented by the following system of equations
min
Iexit(z)
{
ρv(z)− pi(z) + cf − µz∂zv(z)− σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z), v(z)− S
}
,
−∂z[µzg(z)] + σ
2
z
2
∂zzg(z)− (Iexit(z) + λ)g(z, t) + ge(z, t) = 0,∫ ∞
z
g(z)dz = N,∫ zc
z
y∗g(z)dz +
∫ ∞
zc
y(z)cg(z)dz = Q,
e [Q− cfM ] = w.
Finally, note that in an stationary equilibrium ge(z) = g(z) and I = 0.
3 Case study
We apply the model to assess the impact of inputs controls on the Spanish demersal fleet in
the Mediterranean Sea. Data comes from the Expert Working Group on Multiannual plan
for demersal fisheries in the Western Mediterranean elaborated by the Scientific, Technical
and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF-16-21).
The EU demersal fisheries in the Western Mediterranean include the EU fleets from Spain,
France and Italy. According to the Annual Economic Report for 2016 (STECF), 2016a),
which presents data corresponding to 2014, the fleet potentially targeting demersal fisheries
covered by the Multiannual Plan included around 9,000 vessels, with a combined gross ton-
nage of 56,331 GT and engine power of 473,615 kW. There were accounted 932,798 days at
sea, and the estimated employment in these fisheries was equal to 14,119 jobs corresponding
to 10,717 full time equivalent jobs.
The main species caught by demersal fisheries in the Western Mediterranean are: hake, red
mullet, blue whiting, monkfishes, deep-water rose shrimp, giant red shrimp, blue and red
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Table 1: Species and References points catched by the Spanish demersal fisheries
in the Mediterranean Sea
GSA 3A code Scientific name Ref year FMSY Fcurr/FMSY
1 7 HKE Merluccius merluccius 2014 0.39 3.59
1 ARA Aristeus antennatus 2014 0.41 3.41
1 ANK Lophius budegassa 2013 0.16 1.56
1 MUT Mullus barbatus 2013 0.27 4.85
1 DPS Parapenaeus longirostris 2012 0.26 1.65
5 ARA Aristeus antennatus 2013 0.24 1.75
5 ANK Lophius budegassa 2013 0.08 10.50
5 MUT Mullus barbatus 2012 0.14 6.64
5 DPS Parapenaeus longirostris 2012 0.62 1.24
6 ANK Lophius budegassa 2013 0.14 6.50
6 MUT Mullus barbatus 2013 0.45 3.27
6 DPS Parapenaeus longirostris 2012 0.27 5.19
7 ANK Lophius budegassa 2011 0.29 3.34
7 MUT Mullus barbatus 2013 0.14 3.21
Source: (STECF-16-21)
shrimp and Norway lobster. In 2014, the volume of landings of European hake, red mullet
and deep water rose shrimp amounted to 10,000 tonnes that accounted about 69 million
euros (which is around 25% of the overall demersal production). The first species, both
in volume and value, is hake, followed by red mullet and deep water rose shrimp. Hake,
at Geographical Sub Areas 1-7, is principally targeted by Spanish vessels (which land a 58
percent of total). The average price of the red mullet, deep water rose shrimp, and hake
landed by Spanish vessels are (on average) 5.92 euros/kg, 16.15 euros/kg, and 6.68 euros/kg,
respectively.
We consider a stock rehabilitation policy associated with a a reduction in the fishing mortality
level from the status quo, to the maximum sustainable yield fishing mortality level. Table 1
provides the details of the reduction in fishing mortality for each of the 14 different stocks
considered by the Expert Working Group.
In order to compute the output constrains faced by the spanish fleet associated with the
stock rehabilitation policy, we use the value added path generated by the age structured
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Table 2: Species and Prices of Spanish demersal fisheries in the Mediterranean
Sea
Species
DW Red blue and red
hake red mullet Shrimp Monk fish shrimp
country GSA HKE MUT DPS ANK ARA
Spain 1 x x x x
Spain 5 x x x x
Spain 6 x x x x
France /Spain 7 x x
HKE MUT DPS ANK ARA
Share of each Species 1-7 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
HKE MUT DPS ANK ARA
Prices of each Species 1-7 6.68 5.93 16.15 =HKE =DPS
models of each species (see Appendix A.1). Table 2 provides prices.
3.1 Calibration
Table 3: Calibration
Parameter Value Statistic
Q 1 TAC Normalization
e 1.5339 utility parameter L=1/3
ρ 0.04 discount rate Da-Rocha et al. (2014a)
λ 0.04 vessel lifespan 25 years
µ -0.04 Productivity Drift Weninger and Just (2002)
σ2 0.01 Productivity Drift Da-Rocha and Sempere (2016)
S 0 Scrap value No decommissioning scheme
cf 0.2403 fixed cost (STECF-16-21)
We select the values of µ from Weninger and Just (2002) and σ2 from Da-Rocha et al.
(2014a). Given this stochastic process, it is necessary to calibrate six parameters Q, λ, S,
cf , e and ρ. We start by selecting a value of the annual interest rate ρ = 0.04 which is
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standard for the US economy in the macroeconomics literature.8 We set Q = 1. We consider
a vessel life span of 25 years (λ = 0.04). We assume the non-existence of decommissioning
schemes. S = 0. We use data from Structure and economic performance estimates by MS
fleets operating in the Mediterranean & Black Sea region, 20149 to compute the fixed cost.
Finally, we calibrate utility parameter e by solving the model when the economy is non-
distorted ir order to match a labor supply of 1/3. This is a standard normalization in the
macroeconomics literature.
4 Results
This section is divided in two sub-sections. The first one presents the main results regarding
the steady state solution of the model. The second presents the results obtained from the
analysis of the transitional dynamics implied by stock rehabilitation policies leading to a
situation in which all stocks are on their maximum sustainable yield fishing mortality level.
4.1 Steady State
The mass of vessels, N(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
g(z)dz represents the number of “standardized” firms
(fishing vessels ). Firms operate capital (the vessel) and stay active if they find it optimal
to pay the idling cost, cf . Note that the marginal firm (the less efficient active vessel) is
indifferent between paying the idling cost or exiting the market. This marginal firm makes
negative instantaneous profits, i.e. pi(z, t) − cf = −σ22 ∂zzv(z, t) < 0, and the total expected
value of operating the vessel is zero.10
8See, for instance Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).
9 See Table 4.3 of the (STECF-16-21).
10If the marginal active firm decides to leave the market, it obtains the value, v(z) = S = 0. From the
smooth pasting condition and stationarity, (∂zv(z, t) = ∂tv(z, t) = 0) we have equation (1) −pi(z, t) + cf +
σ2
2 ∂zzv(z, t) = 0.
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Figure 3: General Equilibrium effect of a higher Quota in the Steady State
To evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of effort controls (changes in τl)
the model generates the optimal response in three (management) variables: (1) average
catch per unit effort (C.P.U.E.) per day at sea per vessel, Total Factor Productivity TFP =
E[y(z)/l(z)]; (2) average days at sea per vessel, E[l(z)], and (3) the number of vessels, N(t).11
Effort controls –i.e., days-at-sea scheme– change the three management variables at the
same time. First notice that effort controls imply a lower wage. The intuition of this
result is as follows. If effort controls are active, more vessels are active for the same quota.
Notice too that more vessels imply higher operating cost, cfN , and remember from the
household problem in section 2 that higher operating costs imply a lower consumption level
C = [Q − cfM ]. This lower consumption level increases the marginal utility of labour.
11Given that
Y (t) = N(t)
∫ ∞
z(t)
(
y(z, t)
l(z, t)
)
l(z, t)f(z, t)dz.
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Therefore, in equilibrium, wages have to decrease so that the next equation holds
∂CU(C)w(t) = −∂LU(L)⇒ w(t)
C(t)
= e(t),
Note that for the new wage rate (induced by the effort control), the labour supply is lower.
(The graph at the top left in figure (3) illustrates this). Lower wages induce changes in
nominal effort composition. On one hand, the demand of labour for each vessel is reduced,
i.e. effort control is active and E[l(z)] is lower for each vessel (each vessel spends less days
at the sea). On the other hand, lower wages induce some vessels (that otherwise would exit)
to stay, as z decreases, and the average productivity of the fleet, f(z, t) decreases. Therefore
an increment in the fleet size is compatible with less total days at the sea L(t) = N(t)E[l(z)]
and lower effort per vessel E[l(z)] generated by effort controls. The graph at the top right
in figure (3) illustrates this last effect.
Summarising, effort controls generate fleets with higher number of vessels. Productivity of
vessels (TFP= E[y(z)/l(z)]) is reduced, vessels stay less days at the sea (lower E[l(z)]), and
total catches per vessel, E[y(z)] are lower. As a result, both profits per vessel and the vessel’s
value (E[pi(z)] and E[v(z)], respectively) are lower.
Table 4 shows the steady state associated with different levels of effort control τl (measured
as the % of z constrained). This table illustrates what was argued in the previous paragraphs
with some more precise details. For instance, the line showing fleet size shows clearly how
it increases monotonicaly with more restrictive output controls, and the next line show how
this effect is accompanied by a monotonic reduction in the wage rate. Next lines show
a decrease in total factor productivity, employment per vessel, profits per vessel and the
value per vessel. The next lines show the values of several economic variables of interest for
policymakers and their sensitivity to different degrees of input controls.
Table 5 shows the steady state associated with different level of output constraints with and
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Table 4: Effects of different levels control on days
Q =1
Control on Inputs τl (% of z constrained) 0.000 0.187 0.375 0.562 0.750
Fleet Size M 0.132 0.133 0.138 0.149 0.175
wage w 1.485 1.485 1.483 1.479 1.469
data per vessel
TFP E[y(z)/l(z)] 2.971 2.970 2.966 2.958 2.939
Employment per vessel E[l(z)] 2.553 2.505 2.348 2.047 1.536
Yield per vessel E[y(z)] 7.583 7.509 7.254 6.724 5.710
Profits per vessel E[pi(z)] 3.551 3.550 3.532 3.456 3.213
Wealth per vessel E[v(z)] 28.778 28.785 28.764 28.502 27.202
Inequality: Gini Coeff.
Revenues E[y(z)] 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.573
Wealth E[v(z)] 0.624 0.624 0.623 0.620 0.606
Aggregate Accounts
Operating Cost cfM 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.036 0.042
Consumption Q− cfM 0.968 0.968 0.967 0.964 0.958
Compensation of employees wL 0.500 0.495 0.480 0.450 0.395
Gross operating surplus Π 0.468 0.473 0.487 0.514 0.563
Days at the see
Total days at the see L 0.337 0.334 0.324 0.304 0.269
Impact of effort control L/L∗ 1.000 0.991 0.961 0.904 0.799
18
without effort control. The first part of the table shows values for the variables of interest for
different levels of Q and a 25% of restriction in effort. The second part shows values for the
same variables and levels for the Q but for unrestricted effort. The table allows two types of
comparisons. One type is that for the same Q, different levels of restriction in effort imply
different values of the variables. The other is that for the same level of effort constraint,
different Qs imply different values of the variables. Some regularities can be observed. For
instance, a larger Q implies larger fleet size, higher wage rate, higher TFP, lower profits and
lower employment per vessel, for any level of restriction in effort. On the other hand, for
the same Q, more restriction in effort implies larger fleet size, lower wage rate, lower TFP,
lower profits, and lower employment per vessel.
4.2 Transitions
This section focuses on the caracterization of the transition dynamics caused by stock re-
habilitation policies leading the fishery, from a given status quo, to a stationary situation
where all stocks are on their maximum sustainable yield fishing mortality level (Fmsy). Our
strategy follows two steps. First, we set a drastic reduction to Fmsy for all species in the
fishery and compute the Value of landings (VA) using the age estructured model (discussed in
Appendix 1). Second, given the VA for the Spanish fleet associated to a reduction to Fmsy
for all species, we compute the transition dynamics associated with the non distortionary in-
strument τ(t)12 that drive the fishery from the status quo conditions (the VA associated with
the fishing mortality in the status quo) to the stationary solution where fishing mortality is
equal to Fmsy for all species. Formally, we assume that the non distortionary instrument
is such that the VA target in each period is implemented. That is
pi(t) = (1− τ(t))y(t)⇒ Q(t) =
∫ zc(t)
z(t)
y∗(t)g(z, t)dz +
∫ ∞
zc(t)
y(t, z)cg(z, t)dz
12τ(t) can be interpreted as a tax rate or as the price of an ITQ in a system of fully tradable individual
quotas.
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Table 5: Effects of different output constraints
τl (% of z constrained) =0.25
Statistic Q 1.000 1.352 1.704 2.056 2.407
Fleet Size M 0.175 0.268 0.365 0.485 0.606
wage w 1.469 1.844 2.217 2.582 2.946
data per vessel
TFP E[y(z)/l(z)] 3.717 4.670 5.625 6.556 7.495
Employment per vessel E[l(z)] 1.536 1.014 0.747 0.566 0.455
Yield per vessel E[y(z)] 5.710 4.733 4.202 3.710 3.412
Profits per vessel E[pi(z)] 3.213 2.624 2.306 2.009 1.831
Wealth per vessel E[v(z)] 27.202 22.097 19.310 16.744 15.183
Inequality: Gini Coeff.
Revenues E[y(z)] 0.573 0.558 0.533 0.522 0.503
Wealth E[v(z)] 0.606 0.600 0.581 0.577 0.563
Aggregate Accounts
Operating Cost cfM 0.042 0.064 0.088 0.117 0.145
Consumption Q− cfM 0.958 1.202 1.445 1.683 1.921
Compensation of employees wL 0.395 0.500 0.604 0.709 0.812
Gross operating surplus Π 0.563 0.702 0.841 0.974 1.109
Welfare
Utility (society welfare) u(C)− eL −0.456 −0.232 −0.050 0.100 0.230
Total employees L 0.269 0.271 0.273 0.275 0.276
Employment constraint L 1.000 1.008 1.013 1.021 1.025
τl (% of z constrained) =0.00
Fleet Size M 0.132 0.202 0.275 0.366 0.457
wage w 1.485 1.868 2.250 2.626 3.001
data per vessel
TFP E[y(z)/l(z)] 2.971 3.737 4.501 5.251 6.002
Employment per vessel E[l(z)] 2.553 1.680 1.238 0.936 0.753
Yield per vessel E[y(z)] 7.583 6.277 5.573 4.915 4.521
Profits per vessel E[pi(z)] 3.551 2.898 2.546 2.217 2.020
Wealth per vessel E[v(z)] 28.778 23.350 20.393 17.663 16.008
Inequality: Gini Coeff.
Revenues E[y(z)] 0.573 0.558 0.533 0.522 0.503
Wealth E[v(z)] 0.624 0.619 0.601 0.598 0.584
Aggregate Accounts
Operating Cost cfM 0.032 0.048 0.066 0.088 0.110
Consumption Q− cfM 0.968 1.218 1.467 1.712 1.956
Compensation of employees wL 0.500 0.633 0.767 0.900 1.033
Gross operating surplus Π 0.468 0.585 0.700 0.812 0.923
Welfare
Utility (society welfare) u(C)− eL −0.549 −0.323 −0.139 0.012 0.143
Total employees L 0.337 0.339 0.341 0.343 0.344
Employment constraint L 1.000 1.007 1.012 1.018 1.023
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We assume that the tax revenue is returned to household in the form of a non-distortionary
lump sum transfer. Tax revenue is equal to T (t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
τ(t)y(t)g(z, t)dz.13
The transitional dynamics are described by the following system of equations
min
Iexit(z,t)
{
ρv(z, t)− pi(t)z + cf − µz∂zv(z, t)− σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z, t)− ∂tv(z, t), v(z, t)− S(t)
}
,
−∂z[µzg(z, t)] + σ
2
z
2
∂zzg(z, t)− (Iexit(z, t) + λ)g(z, t) + ge(z, t) = ∂tg(z, t),∫ ∞
z(t)
g(z, t)dz = N(t)∫ zc(t)
z(t)
y∗(t)g(z, t)dz +
∫ ∞
zc(t)
y(t, z)cg(z, t)dz = Q(t),
e [Q(t)− cfN(t)] = w(t)
Exit(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
Iexit(z, t)g(z, t)dz
The equilibrium depends on the instrument τ(t). We solve this system using the following
algorithm. First, we compute the stationary value functions v(z|Q) and fleet distributions,
g(z|Q), associated with the status quo, Q0 = 1 and the stock rehabilitation QT = 2.407.
Second, guess a function τ(t). Next, follow the next iterative procedure:
1. Given w(t), compute v(z, t) by solving the HJB equation (5) with terminal condition
v(z|QT ) and compute also Iexit(z, t)
2. Given Iexit(z, t), compute g(z, t) by solving the KFP equation (5) using g(z|Q0) as the
initial conditions,
3. Given g(z, t), calculate w1(t) using equation ( 5) and update w(t). Stop when w1(t) is
sufficiently close to w(t).
4. Given w(t), compute Q(t). Allow entry if Q(t) is lower than the VA path associated
with the stock rehabilitation policy. Stop when Q(t) is sufficiently close to the VA
13Then C = w(t)L(t) + Π(t) + T (t) = Q(t)− cfN(t).
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path. Otherwise update τ(t)
We compute two transitions. The first one is computed when input controls τl are used.
This is related to a stationary constraint (% of z constrained) equal to 25 percent. The
second one is computed for the case of no input controls. Note that, along the transition,
the fraction of z constrained is endogenous (it is a function of w(t)). That is, C.P.U.E. is
given by
y(z, t)
l(z, t)
=

2w(t) if z ≤ zc(t)
√
z
τl(t)
if z > zc(t)
(5)
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Figure 4: Capital dynamics
In our model, malleability of capital is associated with the fleet size dynamics caused by the
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existence of heterogeneous agents and endogenous entry/exit. In an stationary solution, we
observe that capital is non-malleable as N(t) = N(t+ dt) = N and I(t) = 0.
Along the stock rehabilitation path, capital malleability depends on the use (or not) of input
controls. Figure 4(a) shows that without effort controls, some of the firms exit during the
first months and there is entry of firms at the end of the period considered. Therefore,
without input controls capital is malleable as exit of firms produces a reduction in capital in
the fishery. The figure shows how, starting from the status quo number of vessels (normalized
to 1), some vessels exit during the first four months, then the size of the fleet is stable for
several months until the stock is recovered enough and entry is allowed. Entry occurs at a
constant rate during the last months. Figure 4(b) shows the capital dynamics. First there
is a drop in capital (i.e. malleability), then it remains constant, and, finally when the stock
rises enough, the capital rises.
However, Figure 4(c) shows that when input controls are used, capital is non-malleable as
no exit occurs and no reduction in capital is produced. This figure shows how for this type
of policy the number of vessels remains constant for more than a year. Then, once the stock
of fish is recovered enough, entry is allowed. Then entry is produced at a constant rate until
the final period. Figure 4(d) show how the capital remains constant (i.e. non-malleability)
until it starts to rise at a constant rate.
We can summarize those findings by computing the excess of capacity associated with the
use of input controls. We compute excess of capacity asociated to the distortionary policy
as the difference, in each period, between capital in the fishery regulated with input controls
and capital in the fishery regulated with a nos distortionary instrument. In some more
precise terms, we first compute the measure of firms along the transitional path under the
two policy regimes, and once we have these measures we compute the adequate differences
that are represented in figures 5(b) and 5(a).
Figure 5(b) shows that excess of capacity, measured as the difference between measures
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Figure 5: Impact of distortions
g(z, t) associated to the different policies for each z and t, is positive for each z and t. This
difference is larger for low productivity levels (i.e. for z closer to zero). This implies that
the excess of capacity is also associated with lower average levels of productivity as it is
relatively more concentrated in vessels with low productivity.
Figure 5(a) represents, for each moment in time, the difference between the number of vessels
(in percentages) associated to a regulatory policy based in input controls and the number of
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vessels associated to policy based on non distortionary instruments. We name this number
as “the excess of fleet”. The figure shows that the excess of fleet is always positive. It is
increasing during the first periods and it can be close to 16 percent for some period. Later
in time, it remais positive and stabilizes about 14 percent.
The conclusion of the section would be that if the fleet in a given fishery is already overcap-
italizated, a policy of input controls makes the problem even worse as the excess of capital
is always positive with respect that resulting from other less distortionary policies.
5 Conclusions
We show that a management policy based on input controls generates less exit, a less pro-
ductive fleet, and more overcapitalization. In particular, we show that in the steady state
equilibrium, this policy leads to smaller vessels with lower yield and individual profits and
lower wages. The lower wages allow less productive vessels (that otherwise would exit) to
stay in the fishery, reducing the average productivity of the fleet. The result of input controls
is that a higher number of vessels is required to achieve the same biological targets, and this
implies an over-capitalized fleet.
On the other hand, we also caracterize the transition dynamics caused by stock rehabilitation
policies leading the fishery, from a given status quo, to a stationary situation where all stocks
are on their maximum sustainable yield fishing mortality level. We show that along the stock
rehabilitation path, capital malleability depends on the use (or not) of input controls. We
show that without input controls capital is malleable as exit of firms is produced in the
transition path and the stock of capital in the fishery is reduced. However, we also show
that when input controls are used, capital is non-malleable as no exit of firms is produced
along the transition path and the capital is not reduced.
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We also show that the excess of capacity associated to input controls will also produce
lower average levels of productivity as it is relatively more concentrated in vessels with low
productivity. Furthermore, the excess of fleet associated to this type of policies is always
positive. Therefore, if the fleet in a given fishery is already overcapitalizated, a policy of
input controls makes the problem even worse as the excess of capital is always positive with
respect that resulting from other less distortionary policies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Age structured Stock dynamics
For each of the species, we use an age structured model (see figure 6) to evaluate the impact
of each fishing mortality, F (t), trajectory to Fmsy (see figure 7) on landings generated by
the transitional dynamics of the stocks, n(a, t) (see figure 8). Let n(a, t) be the number
of fish of age a at time t. As in Botsford and Wainwright (1985), the conservation law is
described by the following McKendrick-von Foerster partial differential equation.14
∂n(a, t)
∂t
= −∂n(a, t)
∂a
− [m(a) + p(a)F (t)]n(a, t). (6)
Equation (6) shows that the rate of change on the number of fish in a given age interval,
∂n(a, t)
∂t
, is equal to the net rate of departure less the rate of deaths. Given all fish age, the
net rate of departure is equal to
∂n(a, t)
∂a
. The rate of deaths at age a is proportional to
the number of fish of age a, i.e. [m(a) + p(a)F (t)]n(a, t). Recruitment and maximum age
occurs as boundary conditions. We assume that fish die at age A, and constant recruitment
i.e n(0, t) = 1 and n(A, t) = 0.15 For a given F (t) trajectory, catches at age a are equal to
p(a)F (t)n(a, t), therefore Q(t), is equal to
Q(t) =
(∫ A
0
ω(a)p(a)n(a, t)da
)
F (t).
14See Von Foerster (1959) and McKendrick (1926).
15It can be assumed a Stock Recruitment relationship. In that case, each period, the number of fish at age
zero are given by n(0, t) = Ψ(
∫ A
0
ω(a)µ(a)n(a, t)da), where,
∫ A
0
ω(a)µ(a)n(a, t)da is the SSB. See Da-Rocha
et al. (2012).
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Figure 6: Age Structured Models
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Figure 7: Targets
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Distributions by age
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A.2 Finite difference method
Following Achdou et al. (2014) Achdou et al. (2015) we use a finite difference method and
approximate the fuctions v(z, t) and g(z, t) (equations 1 and 2). We use the shorthand
notation vni = v(zi, tn) and g
n
i = g(zi, tn).
Linear Complementarity Problems (LCP). We approximate (1)
ρvni = pi
n
i + [µi]
+
(
vni+1−vni
∆z
)
+ [µi]
−
(
vni −vni−1
∆z
)
+ σ
2
z
2
(
vni+1−2vni +vni−1
∆z2
)
+
(
vn+1i −vni
∆t
)
,
where [µi]
+ = max{µi, 0} and [µi]− = min{µi, 0}. Therefore, collecting terms, we have
ρvni = pi
n
i + aiv
n
i−1 + biv
n
i + civ
n
i+1 +
(
vn+1i − vni
∆t
)
, where
ai = −min{µi, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
,
bi = −max{µi, 0}
∆z
+
min{µi, 0}
∆z
− σ
2
z
∆z2
,
ci =
max{µi, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
.
Note that ai + bi + ci = 0. Then, equation (7) in matrix form
ρvn = pin + Avn +
1
∆t
(
vn+1 − vn) ,
where (for i=1,2,3,4)
A =

b1 c1 0 0
a2 b2 c2 0
0 a3 b3 c3
0 0 a4 bˆ4

.
Boundary conditions: from ∂zv(∞, t) = 0 we have, vnI = vnI+1, then bˆI = bI + σ
2
z
2∆z2
such that
aI + bI = 0.
34
To solve equation (1) we follow Huang and Pang (1988). They show that the variational
inequality problem (the discretized version of equation (1) )
min
Iexit(z,t)
{
ρvn − pin −Avn − 1
∆t
(
vn+1 − vn) , vn − Sn} ,
can be formulated as Linear Complementarity Problems (LCP), i.e
(vn − Sn) ⊥ (B(vn − Sn) + qm+1) = 0,
(vn − Sn) ≥ 0,
B(vn − Sn) + qm+1 ≥ 0,
where B =
(
ρ+ 1
∆t
)
I−A and qm+1 = BSn − pin − 1
∆t
vn+1.16
Kolmogorov Forward equation. We approximate the KFP equation (2) using the fol-
lowing approximation for ∂z[µzv(z, t)]
∂z[µzv(z, t)] '
[(
[µi]
+gni − [µi−1]+gni−1
∆z
)
+ [
(
[µi+1]
−gni+1 − [µi−]−gni
∆z
)]
.
Therefore, we have
(
gn+1i − gni
∆t
)
= ci−1gni−1 + big
n
i + ai+1g
n
i+1 − Ini gni + δn, where
ai+1 = −min{µi+1, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
,
bi = −max{µi, 0}
∆z
+
min{µi, 0}
∆z
− σ
2
z
∆z2
,
ci−1 =
max{µi−1, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
.
16 Matlab provides Yuval Tassa’s Newton-based LCP solver, download from http://www.mathworks.com/
matlabcentral/fileexchange/20952.
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Note that (7) in matrix form
1
∆t
(
gn+1 − gn) = ATgn
where (for i=1,2,3,4)
AT =

b1 a2 0 0
c1 b2 a3 0
0 c2 b3 a4
0 0 c3 b4

.
and gn = Inexitg
n. Finally density is computed as fi =
gi∑I
i=1 gi∆z
, where
∑I
i=1 gi∆z is the mass
of firms.
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